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Abstract
Background: In mid-June 2009 the State of Victoria in Australia appeared to have the highest notification rate of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 influenza in the world. We hypothesise that this was because community transmission of pandemic influenza
was already well established in Victoria at the time testing for the novel virus commenced. In contrast, this was not true for
the pandemic in other parts of Australia, including Western Australia (WA).
Methods: We used data from detailed case follow-up of patients with confirmed infection in Victoria and WA to
demonstrate the difference in the pandemic curve in two Australian states on opposite sides of the continent. We modelled
the pandemic in both states, using a susceptible-infected-removed model with Bayesian inference accounting for imported
cases.
Results: Epidemic transmission occurred earlier in Victoria and later in WA. Only 5% of the first 100 Victorian cases were not
locally acquired and three of these were brothers in one family. By contrast, 53% of the first 102 cases in WA were associated
with importation from Victoria. Using plausible model input data, estimation of the effective reproductive number for the
Victorian epidemic required us to invoke an earlier date for commencement of transmission to explain the observed data.
This was not required in modelling the epidemic in WA.
Conclusion: Strong circumstantial evidence, supported by modelling, suggests community transmission of pandemic
influenza was well established in Victoria, but not in WA, at the time testing for the novel virus commenced in Australia. The
virus is likely to have entered Victoria and already become established around the time it was first identified in the US and
Mexico.
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Introduction
The first confirmed case in Australia of pandemic (H1N1) 2009
influenza (pH1N1) was recorded in Queensland in a returned
traveller from the United States (US) on 9 May 2009 [1], almost
four weeks after the first cases were confirmed in the US on 15 and
17 April 2009 [2]. Victoria confirmed its first case in a traveller
from the US on 20 May [3] and the first case in Western Australia
(WA) was notified on 24 May in a traveller returned from Canada
via the US [4].
The response to the identification of cases of pandemic
influenza initially followed the guidelines of the Australian Health
Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI). [3,5,6],
Management of the pandemic moved through three phases,
described as Delay, Contain, and Protect. An additional phase,
Modified Sustain was applied only in Victoria. The phases were
designed to delay the entry of pandemic virus into Australia, to
contain the virus once it had entered the country, to sustain a
response once community transmission had been established and
to protect the vulnerable once infection was deemed to be
widespread [5,7].
Modified Sustain was announced in Victoria on 3 June 2009 – just
more than two weeks after the first confirmed case in Victoria –
and was followed by a decrease in active case finding. Two weeks
later, on 17 June, the Australian Government announced the
Protect phase, one that had not been included in Australia’s
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pandemic plan, but was added to the original AHMPPI[5,7] once
the less severe nature of the pandemic had been accepted. WA
pre-empted formal adoption of the Protect phase on 13 June, when
all doctors and hospitals were asked to cease active case-finding,
and prioritise influenza testing only to persons with severe
influenza-like illness or established medical risk conditions.
Victoria formally moved to the Protect phase on 23 June.
Although the first laboratory-confirmed cases were identified in
Victoria and WA within four days of each other, reported case
numbers immediately escalated in Victoria but not in WA [8]. We
suggest this observation is explained by the unrecognised
establishment of community transmission of pH1N1 in Victoria,
but not in WA, around or before 26 April, when public health
agencies and laboratories in all Australian states and territories
(‘‘jurisdictions’’) commenced investigating and testing incoming
travellers with influenza-like illnesses from North America for
pandemic influenza. We support our argument with a detailed
review of case follow-up data for both states, a review of other
surveillance data relevant to Victoria and modelling of the
epidemic in both states.
Methods
Background
We compared Victoria and WA because they do not share a
border and a large distance separates these two states, allowing for
importation between states to be more readily recognised. The
state capitals, Melbourne and Perth, are approximately 3,400 km
apart by road, on the south-east and west coasts respectively.
Victoria has a population of approximately 5.4 million of whom
70% live in Melbourne, while the WA population is estimated as
2.2 million, with 74% living in Perth.
As part of the Delay and Contain phases of the Australian
response to the pandemic, active case-finding involved identifica-
tion, isolation, testing and antiviral treatment of incoming
travellers with influenza-like illnesses; and prophylactic treatment
and home quarantine of the close contacts of suspect/confirmed
cases. Influenza is a notifiable disease in all Australian jurisdic-
tions. Public health reference laboratories in Victoria and WA
developed pH1N1-specific nucleic acid amplification tests in the
first week of May.
Early spread of the pandemic virus in both states was
concentrated in the capital cities [3]. High quality case
ascertainment and contact follow-up data were available from
both states. Of all Australian jurisdictions, community transmis-
sion of pandemic influenza was established earliest in Victoria and
latest in WA.
Case ascertainment and follow-up
Case ascertainment and follow up has been described in detail
for Victoria [3]. Until 3 June, when the Modified Sustain phase was
implemented, an attempt was made to identify and confirm every
case and to follow-up every contact of suspected or confirmed
cases. Until this date, 977 cases were identified and 5,807 contacts
were followed-up. In WA prior to the formal implementation of
the Protect phase on 13 June, all suspected or confirmed cases were
actively followed up and travel histories were recorded. By this
date, 102 cases had been confirmed and 232 household contacts of
these cases followed-up, plus a large number of other contacts,
including those on aeroplanes and at schools.
Other relevant data were gathered from international outbreak
reports, postings on the electronic noticeboard ProMED-mail
(http://www.promedmail.org) and a range of other electronic
media reports.
Calculation of the effective reproduction number for
influenza H1N1 2009
The basic reproduction number (R0), indicates the average
number of people each infected person infects in a totally
susceptible population. By contrast, the time dependent effective
reproduction number (R), indicates the average number of people
each infected person infects, given the current interventions in
place, and any prior immunity that reduces the susceptible pool.
The effective reproduction number is always less than or equal to
the basic reproduction number and typically declines gradually as
a disease spreads through the population and collective immunity
increases. The effective reproduction number was calculated using
an adaptation of the method of Bettencourt and co-workers [9–11]
to allow for imported cases and a distributed serial interval. The
adaptation consists of cases being partitioned into local (L) and
imported (M) cases and these are tracked in the data so that the
new imported cases are not considered to be locally acquired
infections and hence are not attributed to infection from previous
local cases.
This method uses a stochastic version of the standard SIR
(susceptible, infective, recovered) model and Bayesian inference to
determine a probability distribution for R that best matches the
case report data.Let t denote the time interval between case
reports (taken to be daily here) and in the time interval (t2t, t) the
number of locally acquired cases is L(t) and the number of
imported cases is M(t). Implicit in the adaptation used here is the
assumption that the imported cases spend their infectious period in
the jurisdiction of interest which is reasonable given those cases
where reported in that jurisdiction. The model uses discrete Euler
time step approximations to the derivatives and so the new
imported cases can be added at each discrete time step without
affecting the model. The usual SIR infective equation can be
written to the same degree of accuracy as in [9–11] as
dI
dt
~bSI{cI~bS(LzM){c(LzM)
According to the SIR model, detailed in [9–11], the number of
newly acquired local cases at time t+t due to the L+M cases at
time t is then given by:
L(tzt)~b(R)(I(t))~b(R)(L(t)zM(t)) with
b(R)~ exp (tc(R{1))
where c is the mean infectious period. At each time step the
new imported cases are added to obtain the total number of cases
that give rise to locally acquired infections in the following time
period.
Since daily case numbers are highly variable a probabilistic
model is needed to allow for this variation. For a given R the
probability of L local cases at time t+t depends on the number of
local and imported cases at time t and is given by:
P L(tzt)/ (L(t)zM(t))DR½ ~P b(R)(L(t)zM(t))½ ~P l½ 
where P[l] is a suitable probability distribution with mean l. The
difference between this and that presented in [9–11] is that the
number of locally acquired cases is used as the data at time t+t
rather than all cases. The standard SIR model only deals with the
average number of cases so a suitable probability distribution for
P[l] is a Poisson distribution which is the most general form
(highest entropy) if only averages are known.
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We are interested in estimating R and how it evolves over time
as new cases are reported. That is, we want to know the
probability distribution of R that best fits the available data. From
Bayes theorem:
P RDL(tzt)/ (L(t)zM(t))½ ~P L(tzt)/ (L(t)zM(t))DR½ P R½ 
P L(tzt)/ (L(t)zM(t))½ 
The denominator of the right hand side is simply a scaling factor
that can be calculated from the sum of the probabilities being 1
and does not need to be explicitly determined. The first term in the
numerator is calculated using the Poisson distribution, as discussed
above, using the case numbers at time t+t. P[R] is the prior
probability distribution of R, which reflects earlier values of R,
either from calculated values or initially from knowledge of the
disease. Here an initial unbiased estimate of P[R] is chosen to be a
uniform distribution on [0 4], that is any value of R in [0 4] is
equally likely. The above equation is iterated to obtain
progressively better estimates for the probability distribution of
R as time progresses and more data become available. As a
probability distribution for R is obtained, compared to other
methods that produce a single value for R, a 95% credible interval
for the R value is easily obtained.
We have verified this method using many thousand numerically
simulated outbreaks with known values of R and different
imported cases distributions. Over all different importation
scenarios the method gave a reliable estimate of the underlying
reproduction number. Previously, imported cases have either been
removed from the calculations [12] or treated as local cases [13].
Both of these approaches overestimate the true effective
reproduction number as either too much transmission is assigned
to local cases or imported cases are assigned as being locally
acquired, respectively.
For daily case report data considered here t=1, which is
shorter than the serial interval of influenza. Using only the
previous day’s data (t=1), as outlined above, results in slow
convergence of the method since changes in the case numbers are
due mostly to the case numbers more than t days earlier. Faster
convergence and tighter bounds on R are obtained if R is
calculated using a weighted sum of L and M stretching back in
time beyond the serial interval. The weighting used is the temporal
distribution of the serial interval, taken to be gamma distributed
here, which weights earlier days relative to how likely the serial
interval was to be that long. See below for further discussion on the
serial intervals used in the analysis.
Numerical simulation of outbreaks
We used mathematical models to calculate the number of days
required for an outbreak initiated by a single imported case to
reach the cases observed on 29 May in Victoria. The
epidemiological parameters that most affect the growth rate of
an outbreak are the reproduction number (defined above) and the
serial interval. The serial interval measures the number of days
between the time of infection of a secondary case and the time of
infection of its infector. As discussed elsewhere [14,15], both the
distribution of the serial interval and its mean influence the growth
rate of outbreaks. Following earlier work [12,16–18] we have
assumed a gamma distribution for the serial interval, and have
considered a range of values for both the reproduction number
and the mean serial interval.
Numerical simulations were performed in MATLAB using a
stochastic version of a SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infective,
recovered) type model. The code is available from the author
(GM). A stochastic model was used rather than a deterministic
SEIR model as it better reflects the variability inherent in the early
stages of an outbreak. Inputs to the model were a fixed
reproduction number (R) and a serial interval distribution (f(t),
t = 1,…M) as described above. New cases at time t were sampled
from a Poisson distribution with mean RS(t)gf(t)I(t2t), where S(t)
is the fraction of the population susceptible and I(t) are the number
of infected individuals at time t. Initially, there were one million
susceptible individuals and one infective case was introduced at
time zero. We performed 1,000 simulations for each pair of values,
and recorded the mean and standard deviation over these
simulations. The simulations were not run beyond a total of
5,000 cases, so the results are insensitive to the initial population
size, which was chosen large enough so that susceptible depletion
was not an issue. Due to the stochastic nature of the method, not
all simulations result in an established outbreak, with some
resulting in what is known as stochastic die out [19]. Only those
simulations that resulted in at least 20 cases were retained.
Sensitivity to model parameters and assumptions
In order to obtain a robust estimate of the time taken for case
numbers to reach those observed on 29 May, we considered values
of the reproduction number ranging from 1.2 to 1.8 and mean
serial interval from 2 to 4 days, consistent with other estimates of
the mean serial interval of pandemic H1N1 of 1.9 days [20], 2.8
days [12,16,21], 3.2 days [22] and longer [23]. We performed
1000 simulations for each pair of values, and recorded the mean
and standard deviation over these simulations.
While the serial interval and the reproduction number are the
key factors that determine the speed at which an outbreak takes
off, heterogeneities in contact patterns may also have some impact.
One of the most likely sources of heterogeneity for this data arises
from age structure [17]. The stochastic SEIR model described
above is homogeneous with respect to age structure. This may be a
limitation of the model. We therefore tested the impact of age
heterogeneity using an alternative model with different reproduc-
tion numbers for adults and children (but with the overall
reproduction number equal to that of our basic model). In order to
test the impact of very high levels of heterogeneity, we assumed
that the reproduction number for children was twice that of adults,
due to heightened mixing between children and lack of prior
immunity. The structured model estimated a reduction in 20–25%
in the days required to reach the case numbers. In particular, for
the intermediate case of a reproduction number of 1.4 and mean
serial interval of 2.8 days, the delay was reduced from 33 to 26
days. The Victorian data could not be reproduced with this age-
structured heterogeneity without using unrealistically large values
of the reproduction number. The same was true of the stochastic
SEIR model described above and other common simulation
models such as deterministic SIR and SEIR type models [24]. We
concluded that, although model structure influenced the estimate
of the delay, even very high levels of heterogeneity had a relatively
minor impact relative to the effect of the reproduction number or
the serial interval, which are the dominant factors in determining
the speed of the spread of the outbreak.
Ethics statement
This research was exempted from ethical review under the
Australian Government National Health & Medical Research
Council’s ‘National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human
Research’ because it was defined as negligible risk and involved
the use of existing collections of data and records that contain only
non-identifiable data about human beings. This study used
aggregated notifiable diseases data that were collected under the
relevant public health legislation in Victoria and WA.
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Results
Pandemic cases in Victoria
The first laboratory confirmed case in Victoria was notified on
20 May. Figure 1 shows notified cases by date of onset and
location of acquisition until the commencement of the Modified
Sustain phase; pandemic phase changes and case identification
milestones are also indicated. Only 5% of the first 100 cases in
Victoria were imported, and only eight of the 977 (0.8%) cases
diagnosed prior to the introduction of the Modified Sustain phase
reported a travel history. The first five diagnosed cases reported
travel to the Americas: three brothers from one family returned
from the US, a visitor from Mexico and another traveller returned
from the US. All five cases were reported on 20–21 May. Two
cases diagnosed on 1 June (numbers 368 and 374) were reported to
have travelled to an affected country in the seven days prior to
illness onset although the country was not specified for either case.
One other case (number 398) diagnosed on 2 June, was reported to
have acquired her infection in Japan.
Surveillance evidence for early transmission in Victoria
An outbreak of influenza due to both pH1N1 and seasonal
H3N2 influenza occurred on the cruise ship, the Pacific Dawn at a
time prior to there being recognised transmission of pH1N1 in
Australia. Of almost 3,000 passengers on the cruise, nine
passengers with a Victorian residential address were subsequently
confirmed to have pH1N1 infection. The earliest onset date of
symptoms amongst the Victorian passengers was 18 May.
Symptom onset for this patient occurred two days after boarding,
consistent with a prodromal infection at the time of embarkation.
Despite recognition of numerous passengers with influenza-like
illness when the ship berthed in Sydney on 25 May, public health
authorities allowed passengers to disperse into the community
because the ship had not visited any port where there were
confirmed cases of pandemic influenza. Retrospectively, it appears
plausible that the Melbourne passenger who joined the cruise on
16 May 2009 with prodromal infection may have been the source
of the shipboard pH1N1 outbreak.
Two other observations, which may also reflect a high point
incidence of disease in Melbourne prior to recognition that local
transmission was occurring. The eighth case to be diagnosed with
pandemic influenza in Victoria was an eight-year-old male
ascertained from routine general practice sentinel surveillance
for influenza (Figure 1). This boy had no travel history or contact
with travellers and symptom onset was on 18 May, two days prior
to notification of the first confirmed Victorian case, the traveller
from the US, who also had symptom onset on 18 May. Around
that time in May, pandemic influenza was also exported from
Melbourne to China. Amongst the first 12 cases in China,
diagnosed between 11 and 25 May, one was a traveller from
Melbourne who had arrived in Beijing on 21 May [25], only one
day after Victoria’s first case was confirmed.
Estimation of the effective reproduction number for
pH1N1 influenza in Victoria and simulation of the
Victorian pandemic
Calculation of the reproductive number from the early
Victorian data for all notified cases was performed as described
in the methods section. Values ranged from R=2.7 around 20
May, when the first Victorian case was reported, and fell steadily
and dramatically to 1.5 by 29 May (Figure 2).
To test the hypothesis of early community transmission of
pH1N1 in Victoria, numerical simulations were performed using
plausible reproductive numbers ranging from 1.2 to 1.8 and with
mean serial intervals (MSI) ranging from 2 to 4 days, consistent
Figure 1. Notified cases by onset date and source and dates of significant events, Victoria 2009. All cases notified to the department
until 4 June inclusive were included in the analysis as they were assumed to be tested during the Delay or Contain phases. Due to the delay between
symptoms onset and notification, the number of cases in this chart decreases in the days prior to 4 June.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011341.g001
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with previous estimates [12,16,20–23]. The length of time needed
to obtain similar case notifications to the number observed around
29 May was determined. For statistical robustness 1,000
simulations for each R and MSI pair were performed and the
average length and the standard deviation calculated (Table 1).
For a representative intermediate estimate of R= 1.4 and an
intermediate value of the MSI= 2.8 days, the average length of
time to obtain the actual case numbers reported on 29 May is 33
days. This is contrasted with the actual time from the first reported
case in Victoria of just 9 days.
Figure 2 shows a typical example of one of the simulation results
with an inputted value of R=1.4 and MSI= 2.8 days and the
reported daily number of cases. Also shown are the calculated
effective reproduction numbers for the simulated and real data.
The deviation away from 1.4 early in the simulated data is due to
the low number of cases. Over this range of reproductive numbers
and mean serial intervals the pandemic commencement date in
Victoria is postulated to be somewhere between 14 April (R= 1.4,
MSI= 3.5) and 9 May (R= 1.6, MSI= 2.5).
Pandemic cases in Western Australia
The first confirmed case of pandemic influenza was notified on
24 May, four days after notification of the first Victorian case, in a
traveller returning from Canada via the US. Only 23 additional
cases had been notified more than two weeks later, with five linked
to travel from North America and the remainder in travellers from
Victoria or linked directly to Victorian-origin cases. Of the first
102 cases notified in WA, 53% were imported from Victoria or
linked directly to Victorian-origin cases.
By 30 June, 247 cases had been notified in WA (Figure 3). Of
these 16 (6%) were travellers from overseas countries with
documented transmission, 94 (38%) were travellers from Victoria
or locally acquired cases linked to Victorian-origin cases, 29 (12%)
were associated with travel from other Australian jurisdictions, 106
(43%) were locally acquired with no travel history and no
identifiable links to imported cases and two (0.8%) were lost to
follow up. Amongst the 94 clearly documented Victorian-
associated cases, there were 72 individual importations over this
period, demonstrating repeated seeding of WA by persons infected
in Victoria.
Estimation of the effective reproduction number for
pH1N1 influenza in Western Australia
Utilising the same method as used for estimating R in Victoria,
and allowing for imported cases, R in WA was estimated to be well
Figure 2. Actual and simulated cases and calculated R, Victoria, 25 April to 29 May 2009. An example of simulated data, calculated with
an effective reproductive number (R) of 1.4 and a mean serial interval of 2.8 days, compared with observed data 25 April to 29 May, Victoria 2009. Also
shown is R calculated from the observed data using a serial interval of 2.8 days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011341.g002
Table 1. Sensitivity analysis of the effective reproduction
number [R] and the mean serial interval [MSI] for the
simulation results.
R\MSI 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.5 4.0
1.2 32.3 (9.5) 46.5 (11.5) 56.3 (14.3) 62.6 (15.5) 78.3 (20.3) 96.5 (25.2)
1.4 19.3 (4.9) 27.41 (6.5) 33.0 (7.7) 35.4 (9.0) 45.0 (9.7) 55.4 (13.2)
1.5 16.6 (4.2) 23.3 (5.5) 27.8 (6.3) 30.6 (7.1) 37.8 (7.7) 46.1 (9.9)
1.6 14.6 (3.6) 19.9 (5.1) 23.9 (5.5) 27.2 (5.8) 32.9 (7.0) 39.2 (8.3)
1.8 11.6 (2.8) 16.1 (3.7) 19.3 (4.6) 21.2 (4.8) 25.7 (6.0) 31.6 (6.4)
The table shows the simulated average number of days before 29 May 2009
that the outbreak in Victoria should have commenced, in order to match the
actual case numbers observed on 29 May 2009. Each reproduction number/
serial interval combination is the average number of days (and standard
deviation) of 1,000 simulations for those values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011341.t001
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below 1 until 23 June. This suggests there was no sustained local
transmission up to that date and that imported cases out-numbered
local cases. From 24 June onwards the calculated values for R
ranged between 1 and 1.4, with an average value of 1.2, and
declined almost to 1.0 in the latter part of July, which corresponded
with the peak of pH1N1 notifications in WA (Figure 4).
Figure 3. Notified cases by onset date and importation source, Western Australia 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011341.g003
Figure 4. Case notification and estimated reproductive number by date using a serial interval of 2.8 days, Western Australia 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011341.g004
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Discussion
We have shown that epidemic curves and estimates for the
effective reproduction number confirm the very different nature of
the pH1N1 outbreaks in Victoria and WA. There appeared to be
no pandemic virus in WA prior to multiple importations from
Victoria, other Australian jurisdictions and overseas. Estimates of
R in WA were consistently around 1.2 and never above 1.4. By
contrast, initial estimates of R in Victoria approached 3, followed
by a rapid – and implausible - decrease over a very short period of
time. This precipitous fall cannot be explained satisfactorily by
potential reduced transmission associated with early control
interventions (such as partial school closure, t isolation and
treatment of cases, and chemoprophylaxis and home quarantine of
contacts), or depletion of susceptible people within the population.
For instance, it took 20 days for the estimated value of R for the
1918–19 pandemic in San Francisco to fall from,2.4 to,1.2 [9].
We suggest the high initial value of R= 2.7 in the Victorian
pandemic and the dramatic decline in 9 days is more likely
explained by unrecognised cases due to an earlier commencement
of the epidemic in Victoria.
The reproduction number for pH1N1 has been calculated for a
number of different countries and ranges from 1.2–1.7 in Mexico,
the US and Peru [20–23]. Higher values of R of ,2 have been
reported for Japan [16] and New Zealand [12] but these are
acknowledged to be influenced by social clustering and increased
diagnostic testing, and are hence most likely over-estimates of the
true value of R. The estimates of R in Victoria and WA reported
here have accounted for imported cases.
When the Victorian pandemic was simulated to reflect a
plausible value of R= 1.4 and a serial interval of 2.8 days, earlier
undetected cases needed to be invoked to reflect the observed
epidemic pattern. In this scenario, modelling suggests that
community transmission of the pandemic virus was most likely
established by 25 April, around the time the virus was first
recognised in the US and Mexico, two weeks before the first
reported case in a traveller to Australia, and almost six weeks
before community transmission was recognised in Victoria. Had
simulations used higher values for R and lower values for the serial
interval, the Victorian pandemic would have been modelled to
commence even earlier. Conversely, there was no need to evoke
undetected cases in WA in order to estimate a plausible range of
values for R.
There was a marked difference in the proportion of imported
cases in Victoria and WA. In WA 50 (49%) of the first 102 cases
had travelled (eight overseas, 38 to Victoria and four to other
Australian states) and a further 20 were directly linked to those
cases that had travelled interstate. This is similar to the experiences
of countries in the northern hemisphere. For example, in Spain
78% of the first 98 cases had acquired their infection abroad [26];
in the United Kingdom 44% of the first 65 cases reported travel to
the United States or Mexico [27]; in Germany 47% of the first 198
cases were described as imported [28] and in Turkey 77% of
the first 111 confirmed cases in the Turkish community were
imported [29]. In Ireland 84% of the first 156 cases were
imported, 14 (9%) were infected in Ireland by an imported case
and two (1%) were infected in Ireland without any identifiable
travel association [30].
We have previously highlighted three observations to support
our hypothesis of early community transmission of pH1N1 in
Victoria [3]. We have now elaborated on the first of these
observations, that a low proportion of Victorian cases had any
travel history or link to travellers. Travel history and exposure
were collected for all 977 cases reported before commencement of
the Modified Sustain phase, so that no cases with a travel history or
exposure to travellers should have been missed.
Secondly, there was a rapid rise in the number of notifications of
locally acquired cases. In Peru a period of almost five weeks
elapsed from identification of the first imported case before a
dramatic increase in cases was recorded [31]. This rapid rise in
Victoria occurred almost immediately and could not have been a
consequence of exposure to the five documented imported cases,
given that all these cases were isolated and their household
contacts quarantined. Either transmission was already well
established in Victoria by this time, or there were continuing
undetected imported cases that fuelled the epidemic. The latter is
unlikely, given widespread media attention and active case-finding
at that time that targeted travellers reporting influenza-like illness.
Thirdly we noted the difference in the median age of 15 years in
the first 977 cases to the median age of 21 years in patients notified
through the general practice surveillance scheme [32], and
suggested this implied an amplification of an established epidemic
in school-aged children. We have now supported these three
arguments with modelling of the Victorian and WA notification
data and two further circumstantial observations related to
Victoria, namely, export of a case to China and an outbreak on
a cruise ship in which the index case was a Melbourne resident.
Other observations also support the hypothesis of early
community transmission in Victoria. We have previously estab-
lished thresholds for the surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI)
in the state [33]. Normally ILI levels are below the baseline
threshold when surveillance commences but, in 2009, ILI levels
were above this threshold when surveillance commenced at the
end of April [34]. None of the first 112 patients admitted with
pH1N1 to seven hospitals in Melbourne had acquired their
infection overseas [35]. Finally, it was possible to identify a
presumed infectious source for only 3.7% of the first 1000 cases in
Victoria (James Fielding, unpublished data).
Sub-typing of influenza A specimens archived at the Victorian
Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory between January and
April 2009 did not identify any pandemic influenza viruses. We
assume that mild disease would generally not have resulted in
presentation for medical care and that retrospective identification
of cases will be difficult.
A plausible scenario
The first alarm about infection with pH1N1 was related to
increased rates of hospitalisation and death due to severe
pneumonia in young adults in Mexico [36]. Identification of
pH1N1 virus from Mexican patients was in response to this
concern. However, the identification of the virus in the US at
around the same time was serendipitous, following the identifica-
tion of two influenza A viruses, one from a study on a point-of-care
test and the other from a routine surveillance system, that could
not be sub-typed [2]. Concern rose in the US when it was realised
that the Mexican and US viruses were essentially identical [2].
The most likely explanation for the discrepancy between the
way the novel virus was detected in Mexico and the US is that the
virus had been circulating far longer in Mexico than the US. One
phylogenetic analysis suggests that the pandemic virus may have
entered the human population between November 2008 and
March 2009 [20] while a second study suggests the virus may have
been causing human infections as early as September 2008 [37].
Widespread unrecognised community transmission causing mild
infections may have been occurring in Mexico for some weeks or
months, eventually leading to recognition of a cluster of severe
pneumonia in a sub-group of susceptible young adults in April
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2009. This cluster would have represented the apex of the
infectious pyramid.
Indeed, identification of the pandemic virus as the cause of
respiratory illness in a 6-month old Mexican infant with disease
onset on 24 February has been informally reported, confirming at
least two months of virus circulation in Mexico prior to
recognition of the outbreak [38]. It is similarly conceivable that
pH1N1 was circulating unrecognised in Victoria for several weeks
before it was first detected. In those weeks specific testing was
targeted at incoming travellers from North America, with no hint
that the virus was already circulating in the Victorian community.
A clinical attack rate below 1.4% due to pH1N1 has been
estimated for the spring of 2009 in the US [39], a clinical attack
rate of 7.5% has been estimated in New Zealand for the entire
influenza season between April and August 2009 [40] and in
England the estimated clinical attack rate was 10 times lower than
the cumulative incidence of infection of 20% suggested from
serosurveys of 15–24 year olds [41]. We suggest that a relatively
low clinical attack rate - but a much higher infection rate - by a
virus causing generally mild disease would allow community
transmission of the virus to go unrecognised for many weeks. We
further suggest that this occurred in Mexico and Victoria and may
indeed have occurred in other countries [42].
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